A Novel Approach to Detect Black Hole and Worm Hole Attacks in MANETs

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Abstract—Mobile Ad-hoc networks (MANET) are collections of self-organizing mobile nodes with dynamic topologies and have no fixed infrastructure. Because of their dynamic adhoc nature, in which unknown device develops spontaneous interactions between themselves, then networks are particularly vulnerable to various security threats. Therefore it is proposed to design and implement malicious node detection system to avoid black hole and worm hole attacks in MANETs. In this paper we use Cooperative bait detection scheme to detect black hole attacks. To detect Worm hole attack as well we incorporated Performance Evaluation Multipath Algorithm in CBDS scheme. Worm hole attacks are detected using hop-count and time delay analysis from the viewpoint of users without any special environment assumptions.

Keywords—CBDS, DSR (Dynamic Source Routing), Reverse Tracing, MANETs, Performance Evaluation Multipath algorithm, Adhoc

I. INTRODUCTION

Mobile Adhoc network is infrastructureless network that self-configured automatically by mobile nodes without the help of any centralized management. In MANET nodes have special characteristics that each node in MANET behaves like receiver and transmitter and allow communicating with other nodes in its radio range [1]. In order for a node to forward a packet to a node that is out of its radio range, the support of other nodes in the network is needed; this is known as multi-hop communication. Therefore each node must act as both a host and a router at the same time. The network topology normally changes due to the mobility of mobile nodes in the network. In MANET each node can communicate with the help of its neighbor node that’s comes in its radio range. Each node forward their packet to their neighbor node towards destination where path for transmitting message packet is suggested by routing protocol as shortest path [2]. Every routing protocol concentrates over shortest path where some malicious node over network use this greediness of routing protocol and present an illusion of shortest path between two end point of network and attack major traffic over the network [3].

In black hole attacks, a node transmits a malicious broadcast informing that it has the shortest path to the destination, with the goal of intercepting messages. Worm hole attack attract massage packet and play number of misbehave with that routing packet like scanning of confidential message, drop, corrupt and change transmitted massage over network [4]. In this paper, our focus is on detecting black hole attacks and worm hole attack using a dynamic source routing (DSR) based routing technique. DSR is a Dynamic Source Routing protocol. It has two main processes: route discovery and route maintenance. To execute the route discovery phase, the source node broadcasts a Route REQuest (RREQ) packet through the network. If an intermediate node has routing information to the destination in its route cache, it will reply with a RREP to the source node.
When destination receives the RREQ, it can know each intermediary node’s address among the route. The destination node relies on the collected routing information among the packets in order to send a reply RREP message to the source node along with the whole routing information of the established route. DSR does not have any detection mechanism, but the source node can get all route information concerning the nodes on the route.

II. RELATED WORK

In [5], Liu et al. proposed a 2ACK scheme for the detection of routing misbehaviour in MANETs. In this scheme, two-hop acknowledgement packets are sent in the opposite direction of the routing path to indicate that the data packets have been successfully received. A parameter acknowledgement ratio, i.e., Rack, is also used to control the ratio of the received data packets for which the acknowledgment is required. This scheme belongs to the class of proactive schemes and, hence, produces additional routing overhead regardless of the existence of malicious nodes.

In [6], Xue and Nahrstedt proposed a prevention mechanism called best-effort fault-tolerant routing (BFTR). Their BFTR scheme uses end-to-end acknowledgements to monitor the quality of the routing path (measured in terms of packet delivery ratio and delay) to be chosen by the destination node. If the behavior of the path deviates from a predefined behavior set for determining “good” routes, the source node uses a new route. One of the drawbacks of BFTR is that malicious nodes may still exist in the new chosen route, and this scheme is prone to repeated route discovery processes, which may lead to significant routing overhead.

In [7], Hongsong et al. proposes an intrusion detection model to combat the black hole attack in AODV routing protocol. In this model, a security agent, established by a hardware thread in network processor uses parallel multithreading architecture; try to detect two cases of figure of attack. Those exploiting AODV control messages RREQ (Route REQUEST) and RREP (Route REPLY). The agent monitors the RREQ-RREP messages at real-time and if any detection rule is violated, the black hole attack is detected and the malicious node is isolated and recorded to a black list. This solution requires a special material for its implementation. It is dedicated to AODV protocol and it considers only control messages, however that black hole attack can target data messages.

In [8], the concept of leashes is introduced to detect worm hole attacks. A leash is any information added to a packet in order to restrict the distance that the packet is allowed to travel. A leash is associated with each hop. Thus, each transmission of a packet requires a new leash. Two types of leashes are considered, namely geographical leashes and temporal leashes. A geographical leash is intended to limit the distance between the transmitter and the receiver of a packet. A temporal leash provides an upper bound on the lifetime of a packet. As a result, the packet can only travel a limited distance. A receiver of the packet can use these leashes to check if the packet has traveled farther than the leash allows and if so can drop the packet.

In [9], Mahajan et al. proposed some proposals to detect worm hole attacks like: 1) The abrupt decrease in the path lengths can be used as a possible symptom of the worm hole attack. 2) With the available advertised path information, if the end-to-end path delay for a path cannot be explained by the sum of hop delays of the hops present on its advertised path, existence of worm hole can be suspected. 3) Some of the paths may not follow the advertised false link, yet they may use some nodes involved in the worm hole attack. This will lead to an increase in hop delay due to worm hole traffic and subsequently an increase in end-to-end delay on the path. An abrupt increase in the end-to-end delay and the hop queuing delay values that cannot be explained by the traffic supposedly flowing through these nodes can lead us to suspect the presence of worm hole.

III. PROPOSED WORK

This paper presents detection system called the cooperative bait detection scheme (CBDS), which aims at detecting and preventing malicious nodes launching black hole attacks in MANETs [11]. In order to detect worm hole attacks along with Black hole attacks in MANETs we incorporated Performance Evaluation Multipath Algorithm in CBDS scheme. Worm hole attacks are detected using hop-count and time delay analysis from the viewpoint of users without any special environment assumptions. In this system the source node stochastically selects an adjacent node with which to cooperate, in the sense that the address of this node is used as bait destination address to bait malicious nodes to send a reply RREP message. Malicious nodes are thereby detected and prevented from participating in the routing operation, using a reverse tracing technique. In this setting, it is assumed that when a significant drop occurs in the packet delivery ratio, an alarm is sent by the destination node back to the source node to trigger the detection mechanism again. The modified CBDS scheme
comprises four steps: 1) the initial bait step; 2) the initial reverse tracing step; 3) the shifted to reactive defence step, i.e., the DSR route discovery start process; 4) performance evaluation multipath phase.

A. Initial Bait Step

The aim of the bait phase is to attract a malicious node to send a reply RREP by sending the bait RREQ’ that it has used to advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node that detains the packets that were converted. The following method is designed to generate the destination address of the bait RREQ’. The source node selects an adjacent node, i.e., \( n_r \), within its one-hop neighbourhood nodes and cooperates with this node by taking its address as the destination address of the bait RREQ’. The bait phase is activated whenever the bait RREQ’ is sent prior to seeking the initial routing path. The follow-up bait phase analysis procedures are as follows. First, if the \( n_r \) node had not launched a black hole attack, then after the source node had sent out the RREQ’, there would be other nodes’ reply RREPs in addition to that of the \( n_r \) node. Therefore, the reverse tracing program in the next step would be initiated in order to detect this route. If only the \( n_r \) node had sent the reply RREP, it means that there was no other malicious node present in the network and that the CBDS had initiated the DSR route discovery phase. Second, if \( n_r \) was the malicious node of the black hole attack, then after the source node had sent the RREQ’, other nodes (in addition to the \( n_r \) node) would have also sent reply RREPs. This would indicate that malicious nodes existed in the reply route. In this case, the reverse tracing program in the next step would be initiated to detect this route. If \( n_r \) deliberately gave no reply RREP, it would be directly listed on the black hole list by the source node. If only the \( n_r \) node had sent a reply RREP, it would mean that there was no other malicious node in the network, except the route that \( n_r \) had provided; in this case, the route discovery phase of DSR will be started. The route that \( n_r \) provides will not be listed in the choices provided to the route discovery phase.

B. Initial Reverse Tracing Step

To detect the behaviours of malicious nodes, the reverse tracing program is used through the route reply to the RREQ’ message. The malicious node will reply with a false RREP if it has received the RREQ’. Then the reverse tracing operation will be conducted for nodes receiving the RREP, with the aim to deduce the dubious path information and the temporarily trusted zone in the route. It should be emphasized that the CBDS is able to detect more than one malicious node simultaneously when these nodes send reply RREPs.

![Fig. 1 Black hole attack-node n4 drops all the data packets.](image)

When a malicious node, for example, \( n_m \), replies with a false RREP, an address list \( P = \{ n_1, \ldots, n_k, \ldots, n_m, \ldots, n_l \} \) is recorded in the RREP. If node \( n_k \) receives the RREP, it will separate the \( P \) list by the destination address \( n_l \) of the RREP in the IP field and get the address list \( K_k = \{ n_1, \ldots, n_k \} \), where \( K_k \) represents the route information from source node \( n_1 \) to destination node \( n_k \). Then, node \( n_k \) will determine the differences between the address list \( P = \{ n_1, \ldots, n_k, \ldots, n_m, \ldots, n_l \} \) recorded in the RREP and \( K_k = \{ n_1, \ldots, n_k \} \). Consequently, we get \( K' \)

\[
K' = P - K_k = \{ n_{k+1}, \ldots, n_m, \ldots, n_l \}
\]

(1)

Where \( K' \) represents the route information to the destination node (recorded after node \( n_k \)). The operation result of \( K_k \) is stored in the RREP’s “Reserved field” and then reverted to the source node, which would receive the RREP and the address list \( K' \) of the nodes that received the RREP. If A is not the same with B and C, then the
received \( K'_k \) can perform a forward back. Otherwise, \( n_i \) should just forward back the \( K'_k \) that was produced by itself. In Fig. 2, although \( n_i \) can reply with \( K'_k = \{n_5, n_6\} \), \( n_i \) will check and then remove \( K'_k \) when it receives the RREP. After the source node obtains the intersection set of \( K'_k \), the dubious path information \( S \) replied by malicious nodes could be detected, i.e.,

\[
S = K'_1 \cap K'_2 \cap K'_3 \ldots \cap K'_k.
\]

(2)

Given that a malicious node would reply the RREP to every RREQ, nodes that are present in a route before this action happened are assumed to be trusted. The set difference operation of \( P \) and \( S \) is conducted to acquire a temporarily trusted set \( T \), i.e.,

\[
T = P - S.
\]

(3)

To confirm that the malicious node is in set \( S \), the source node would send the test packets to this route and would send the recheck message to the second node toward the last node in \( T \). This requires that the node had entered a promiscuous mode in order to listen to which node the last node in \( T \) sent the packets to and fed the result back to the source node. The source node would then store the node in a black hole list and broadcast the alarm packets through the network to inform all other nodes to terminate their operation with this node. If the last node had dropped the packets instead of diverting them, the source node would store it in the black hole list.

The situations faced by malicious nodes in the route are illustrated in Fig. 2.

In this case, a single malicious node \( n_4 \) exist in the route, the source node \( n_1 \) pretends to send a packet to the destination node \( n_6 \). After \( n_1 \) sends the RREQ, node \( n_2 \) replies with a false RREP along with the address list \( P = \{n_1, n_2, n_3, n_6, n_5, n_k\} \). Here, node \( n_2 \) is a random node filled in by \( n_6 \). If \( n_1 \) had receive the replied RREP by \( n_2 \), it would separate the \( P \) list by the destination address \( n_1 \) of the RREP in the IP field and get the address list \( K'_1 = \{n_1, n_2, n_3\} \). It would then conduct the set difference operation between the address lists \( P \) and \( K'_1 \) to acquire \( K'_2 = P - K'_1 = \{n_6, n_5, n_k\} \), and would reply with the \( K'_2 \) and RREP to the source node \( n_1 \) according to the routing information in \( P \). Likewise, \( n_2 \) and \( n_1 \) would perform the same operation after receiving the RREP; will obtain \( K'_2 = \{n_2, n_3, n_6\} \) and \( K'_3 = \{n_5, n_6, n_k\} \) respectively; and then will send them back to the source node for intersection. The dubious path information of the malicious node, i.e., \( S = K'_1 \cap K'_2 \cap K'_3 \) = \{n_6, n_5, n_k\}, is obtained. The source node then calculates \( P - S = T = \{n_1, n_2, n_3\} \) to acquire a temporarily trusted set. Finally, the source node will send the test packets to this path and the recheck message to \( n_2 \), requesting it to enter the promiscuous mode and listening to \( n_3 \). As the result of the listening phase, it could be found that \( n_3 \) might divert the packets to the malicious node \( n_4 \); hence, \( n_2 \) would revert the listening result to the source node \( n_1 \), which would record \( n_4 \) in a black hole list.
Fig. 3 Reverse tracing program of the CBDS approach.

In Fig. 3, if there was a single malicious node $n_4$ in the route, which responded with a false RREP and the address list $P = \{n_1, n_2, n_3, n_5, n_6\}$, then this node would have deliberately selected a false node $n_5$ in the RREP address list to interfere with the follow-up operation of the source node. However, the source node would have to intersect the received $K_1'$ to obtain $S = K_1' \cap K_2' \cap K_3' = \{n_4, n_5, n_6\}$, $T = P - S = \{n_1, n_2, n_3\}$ and request $n_2$ to listen to the node that $n_5$ might send the packets to. As the result of this listening phase, the packets that should have been diverted to $n_5$ by $n_3$ should have been sent to $n_2$. The source node would then store this node to the black hole list. In Fig. 3, if $n_5$ and $n_4$ were cooperative malicious nodes, we would obtain $T = P - S = \{n_1, n_2, n_3\}$, and $n_2$ would be requested to listen to which node $n_3$ might send the packets. Either $n_5$ or $n_4$ would be detected, and their cooperation stopped. Hence, the remaining nodes would be baited and detected.

C. Shifted to Reactive Defense Phase.

After the above (steps A and B), the DSR route discovery process is activated. When the route is established and if at the destination it is found that the packet delivery ratio significantly falls to the threshold, the detection scheme would be triggered again to detect for continuous maintenance and real-time reaction efficiency. The threshold is a varying value in the range $[85\%, 95\%]$ that can be adjusted according to the current network efficiency. The initial threshold value is set to 90%. A dynamic threshold algorithm is designed that controls the time when the packet delivery ratio falls under the same threshold. If the descending time is shortened, it means that the malicious nodes are still present in the network. In that case, the threshold should be adjusted upward. Otherwise, the threshold will be lowered. It should be noticed that the CBDS offers the possibility to obtain the dubious path information of malicious nodes as well as that of trusted nodes; thereby, it can identify the trusted zone by simply looking at the malicious nodes reply to every RREP.

D. Performance Evaluation Multipath Phase.

In this Phase worm hole attacks are detected without any extra hardware requirements. The basic idea behind this work is that the worm hole attack reduces the length of hops and the data transmission delay. First, we randomly generate a Number in between 0 to maximum number of nodes. Then we make the Node with same number as transmitter node. After this we generate the route from selected transmitting node to any destination node with specified average route length. Then we send packet according to selected destination and start timer to count hops and delay. The process is repeated and the routes, their hops and delay are stored. Now if the hop count for a particular route decreases abruptly for average hop count then at least one node in the route must be attacker. Now we check the delay of all previous routes which involve any on node of the suspicious route. Now the node not encounter previously should be malicious let there are N such nodes. If N == 1 then it is the attacker else wait for future sequences which show deviation and involve only one of N nodes. Nodes are black listed by the nodes hence they are not involved in future routes. Whole process is repeated until we didn’t get the specified goal. The goal can be to get complete list of malicious nodes.

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IV. SIMULATION RESULTS

A simulation of above described CBDS is developed for identifying the black hole attack performed by the malicious node. Simulation is obtained using Java and Netbeans Technology. In these simulation scenario twenty nodes has been created. Each node has a communication range of 200.

Fig 4. Configuration of node

As shown different path from one to another node is calculated using DSR algorithm. Among the different path (1,3,5,11) has been chosen for our analysis. Consider node 0 as a source node and 11 as destination node. As source node 0 send data to the destination node 11, the intermediate nodes 5 and 3 forward the data to the destination node as shown in Fig 5. Consider Node 7 as malicious node, which performs the black hole attack. It advertises as having shortest path to the destination, as a result it receives the data from source node 0 and does not forward to the destination node 11. The original path before attack is 1,3,5,11. After the attack the path is 1,7.

Fig. 5 Data transmission between Nodes before Attack
As shown in the Fig. 8 node 1 initiate the reverse tracing program and determines that there is malicious node and hence detect the malicious node which is node 7 in this case. Nodes 16 and 13 have been considered as worm hole attacker. These nodes divert the routing of the data packets. As shown in fig 10 the original path was 1,3,5,11 before the worm hole attack was performed. After the worm hole attack is performed the malicious path is 1,16,13,11. The Source node determines on the basis of hop count analysis and time delay that node 16 and 13 are the worm hole attacker and hence determines that they are malicious nodes.
V. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, a new mechanism (called the CBDS) is used for detecting malicious nodes in MANETs under gray/collaborative black hole attacks. To this mechanism, performance Evaluation Multipath Algorithm has been added to detect the worm hole attack in MANETs. As future work, we intend to investigate the integration of the CBDS with other well-known message security schemes in order to construct a comprehensive secure routing framework to protect MANETs against miscreants. We also intend to use CBDS in other routing protocol like AODV.

REFERENCES


